In this week’s fantastic Inside Baseball column by Jon Heyman of CBS Sports, he revealed an interesting little nugget – the Atlanta Braves had asked the Milwaukee Brewers about catcher Jonathan Lucroy, but were rebuffed.
Atlanta inquired about the Brewers’ Jonathan Lucroy but were told he is unavailable
Lucroy, who turns 29 in June, is one of the best catchers in baseball. He had a breakout year in 2014, hitting .301/.373/.465 with a league-leading 53 doubles, starting behind the plate for the NL All-Star Team and finishing fourth in MVP voting. But he’s struggled through 12 games this season, hitting just .133/.216/.178 with only one extra base hit. He’s also currently on the disabled list, nursing a fractured toe. Lucroy is signed through the 2016 season, and the Brewers also own a paltry $5.25 million on him for the 2017 season.
So why wouldn’t the Braves be interested in a guy like that? Two-thirds of the teams in baseball could use a catcher like Lucroy, and the one-third that couldn’t already *have* a catcher like him. It’s easy – Atlanta doesn’t need Lucroy because they’re not a good team, probably won’t be a playoff contender until 2017 (Lucroy’s final year of control through the club option), it would take too many assets from a recently rebuilt farm system to acquire Lucroy, and simply adding a top-tier catcher wouldn’t change much of anything.
Whew. That’s a lot to process. Maybe it’s *not* that simple. Let me tackle these points.
They’re not a good team. “But Joe!”, you say. “The Braves are 20-20! They’re only 3.5 games behind the Nationals in the NL East! How can you call them bad?” All of those points are quite true, but there are some underlying issues with them. Atlanta has feasted on the terrible Miami Marlins in the first half this year, smoking their division rival to the tune of a 7-2 record. Against the rest of the NL East (Mets, Phillies, Nationals), the Braves are just 6-12. The team has just nine games against the Marlins the rest of the way, compared to 36 against the other three teams in the division. That’s not a good thing.
Also, the Braves haven’t played any of the good teams in the NL Central or West yet – in fact, they’ve played seven games against the Reds, one with the Brewers, and none against any of the other NL Central or West teams. Atlanta has managed to avoid the Cardinals, Cubs, Dodgers, and Giants so far, which will definitely help pad a National League team’s record. It’ll be interesting to see if the Braves still have a good record in two weeks after a ten game west coast road trip to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Arizona.
They probably won’t be a playoff contender until 2017. 2017 is the year targeted by the Braves front office as their return to contention. And that’s quite a reasonable goal, especially when you look at the current composition of Atlanta’s roster. Freddie Freeman and Andrelton Simmons have established themselves as cornerstones in Atlanta, but who else do the Braves have on the offensive side of the ball? Chris Johnson and Nick Markakis will both be around in 2017, but both are on the wrong side of 30. Cameron Maybin has gotten off to a good start, but he’s never been able to stay healthy and productive throughout his major league career.
Jace Peterson has played well at second, but could just be keeping the position warm for top prospect Jose Peraza. Christian Bethancourt has been a disaster behind the plate, which is why this whole Lucroy conversation is even happening. The only young Braves starter that hasn’t struggled at points this season has been Shelby Miller, with Julio Teheran, Alex Wood, and Mike Foltynewicz all alternating brilliance with despair. Acquiring Lucroy is a “win now” move, and the Braves simply aren’t set up to win now. They’re set up to win when Lucroy will be 31, and who knows what kind of a player he’ll be then.
It would take too many assets from a recently rebuilt farm system to acquire Lucroy. Whether or nor you think Jonathan Lucroy is a good player or not is irrelevant. You simply don’t see franchise backstops like him, especially franchise backstops like him signed so cheaply, get traded. Luckily for us, a pair of would-be franchise backstops got dealt this winter: Miguel Montero and Derek Norris. The Cubs took on all of the $40 million owed to the 31-year old Montero over the next three seasons to avoid giving up better prospects. Norris is just 26 and won’t be a free agent until after 2018, and even though he’ll cost more over the next four seasons than Lucroy will and isn’t as good of a player, he still cost the Padres a major league ready starter in Jesse Hahn.
Lucroy would end up costing about a quarter of that in salary, meaning the prospects an acquiring team would need to give up would have to be substantial. John Hart and company have done a fantastic job at rebuilding the Braves farm system this winter, so why tear all of that hard work apart and trade (just as an example) Bethancourt, Peraza, and Matt Wisler (if not more) for Lucroy?
Simply adding a top-tier catcher won’t change much of anything. This is the most important point to consider, in my opinion. While Bethancourt has struggled this year, he’s ceded the majority of his playing time to veteran A.J. Pierzynski, who’s hit .295/.330/.455 with three homers in 23 games. Just presume that Lucroy goes off in Atlanta and hits say, .320/.400/.490. That’s awesome, but it’s not going to suddenly make Nick Markakis hit for power. It’s not going to immediately make the Braves’ monstrous question mark in left field competent. It’s not going to turn the third base platoon into Adrian Beltre. Aside from catcher, Atlanta has legitimate questions about two positions and less concrete questions about another three, not to mention the shakiness of the pitching staff.
While trading for Lucroy might be the sexy move that could push a team over the edge, I don’t think Atlanta would be that team that gets nudged to contention. Instead of having an effect like the 1993 Fred McGriff trade, I think acquiring Lucroy would end up more like the 2007 Mark Teixeira trade for the Braves – putting a bandage on one of several bullet holes at the expense of the organization’s long-term future.