Much is being made of Arizona’s decision yesterday to pitch to Prince Fielder in the seventh inning of a 2-0 game, and first base open. There were two outs, and Ian Kennedy just needed to get out of the inning. Rickie Weeks was on deck. Diamondbacks manager Kirk Gibson opted to pitch to Fielder, and he sent the second pitch he saw over the right field wall to make the game 4-0 and slash Arizona’s chances of a comeback with the way Yovani Gallardo was pitching.
But was letting Kennedy, who had already thrown 109 pitches and allowed three hits over the last two innings, pitch to Fielder the right move? Almost all accounts are pointing towards “no”. While Fielder only has two hits off Kennedy in eight at bats and five strikeouts, one of those hits is a home run. Fielder was 1/3 off Kennedy at that point on the day with a strikeout, so it’s not as if he was getting made foolish all day. Fielder absolutely smashes right-handers, with a 1.047 OPS againt them on the season. Rickie Weeks, who was on deck, is only at .814 on the year against righties, and is actually more successful against left-handers (.832 OPS). Moreover, against Kennedy, Weeks was 2/10, so there wasn’t some sort of giant success pattern there.
There’s one other thing that no one seems to be taking into account here when dealing with the situation. Instead of letting Kennedy pitch to Fielder….why not bring in Brad Ziegler, who came after the home run, and let him pitch to Fielder? Ziegler may be a right-hander like Kennedy, but unlike Kennedy (who allows a .626 OPS to righties, which is actually pretty damn goodo), Ziegler absolutely kills them to the tune of a .464 OPS on the season and 36 strikeouts in 149 at bats. It’s not as if Gibson was worried about only using Ziegler for a batter, because that’s what he ended up doing when he pinch hit for him in the eighth inning after just two pitches and one batter (Weeks).
Letting Kennedy pitch to Fielder didn’t cost the Diamondbacks the game. They only scored one run all game, and the Brewers had two at the time the homer was hit. But it could have completely changed Gibson’s strategy over the game’s final two innings. Instead of letting Sean Burroughs, who has not a lot of redeeming value, pinch hit for Ziegler in the eighth, he could have used Paul Goldschmidt, who has titanic power and an .855 OPS against righties this season. Hell, I don’t even know why Goldschmidt didn’t start the game. Gibson went with veteran Lyle Overbay instead, who went 0/3 with a strikeout and saw just ten pitches. If Goldschmidt came up in the eighth inning of a 2-1 game after Roberts’ homer, he could have easily tied the game with one swing of the bat. Instead, Gibson gave up after the homer and sent Burroughs up, who struck out quietly.
A lot of the times in the playoffs, managers tend to overmanage (SEE: Joe Girardi bringing in Mariano Rivera to get one out against the Tigers in a six run game on Saturday). I think in this situation, Gibson undermanaged.
